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T
he issue of human 
overpopulation has fallen out of 
favor among most contemporary 
demographers, economists, and 
epidemiologists. Discussing population 
control has become a taboo topic. Yet, 
this taboo has major implications for 
public health.
The silence around overpopulation 
prevents the global health community 
from making the necessary link 
between the planet’s limited ability 
to support its people (its carrying 
capacity—see sidebar on following 
page) and health and development 
crises. In this article, I describe how 
popular thinking on population 
control has been shaped over the 
last 200 years, and how our failure to 
address the population explosion may 
be one cause of recent epidemics and 
social unrest.
Overpopulation Concerns Peak, 
Then Decline
The question of human overpopulation 
and its relationship to human carrying 
capacity has been controversial for over 
two centuries. In 1798 the Reverend 
Thomas Malthus put forward the 
hypothesis that population growth 
would exceed the growth of resources, 
leading to the periodic reduction of 
human numbers by either “positive 
checks”, such as disease, famine, and 
war, or “preventive checks”, by which 
(in the absence of contraception) 
Malthus meant restrictions on 
marriage. This “Malthusian view” was 
rapidly accepted by most politicians, 
demographers, and the general public, 
and remained popular until fairly 
recently.
Malthus’s worst fears were not borne 
out through the century following his 
death in 1834—food production largely 
kept pace with the slowly growing 
global population. However, soon after 
1934, the global population began to 
rise steeply as antibiotics, vaccines, and 
technology increased life expectancy. 
By the 1960s, concerns of a 
mismatch between global 
population and global 
food supply peaked—
expressed in books such 
as Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 The 
Population Bomb [1]. This 
book predicted a future 
scarred by increasing 
famine, epidemic, and 
war—the three main 
Malthusian positive checks.
In 1966, United States 
President Lyndon Johnson 
shipped wheat to India 
to avert a famine on the 
condition that the country 
accelerate its already 
vigorous family planning 
campaign [2]. Johnson was part of 
an unbroken series of US presidents 
concerned with the harmful effects of 
rapid population growth in developing 
countries. This line extended (at 
least) from John F. Kennedy to Jimmy 
Carter. George H. W. Bush was also 
sympathetic to this view, prior to 
becoming vice president in 1981.
But the 1970s surprised population 
watchers. Instead of being a period 
shadowed by calamitous famine, the 
new crop strains introduced by the 
“Green Revolution” (especially grains 
such as rice, wheat, and maize) caused 
a dramatic increase in the global 
production of cereals, the main source 
of energy in the global diet. Among 
the development community, despair 
turned into cautious optimism. By the 
end of the decade, the public health 
community felt sufﬁ  ciently empowered 
to proclaim “Health for All by the 
Year 2000”. Average life expectancy 
continued to zoom upwards almost 
everywhere—even in sub-Saharan 
Africa.
The introduction of safe 
contraception contributed to a rapid 
fertility decline in many countries. But 
while the rate of global population 
growth declined from its peak in the 
late 1960s, the absolute increment of 
increase in annual global population 
continued to grow. Most population-
related scientists, including food 
scientists and demographers, as well as 
US President Jimmy Carter, continued 
to be very concerned about global 
overpopulation. In 1970, the father of 
the Green Revolution, the agricultural 
scientist Norman Borlaug, was awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize. In his Nobel 
lecture, Borlaug warned that the 
success of the Green Revolution would 
buy a breathing space for humankind 
of three decades, unless equivalent 
action was taken to reduce fertility rates 
[3]. China tightened its fertility policy 
in this decade, introducing its one-child 
policy in 1979.
Concern for the Third World Fades
With hindsight, the 1970s can be 
seen as the decade when widespread 
concern about overpopulation started 
to fade. The social and economic 
milieu of many developed countries, 
especially in the US, started to change. 
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US foreign aid, as a percentage of the 
gross national product, declined from 
the late 1960s, perhaps in part because 
of the competing needs of the Vietnam 
War but also perhaps because of the 
apparent success of development in the 
Third World. The economic policies 
known as Keynesianism, which had 
been dominant since the end of World 
War II in many developed nations, 
came under sustained attack. These 
policies had placed a high value on 
full employment and social security. 
Keynesian policies restrained domestic 
inequality through high taxation and 
the promotion of social norms that 
censured conspicuous consumption 
(such as company executives exercising 
restraint in their personal salaries 
and people buying small houses). 
Shortly before his death, J. M. Keynes 
had also been crucially involved 
in the establishment of the World 
Bank. Keynes appears to have been 
personally committed to the advance 
of global justice, and to the reduction 
of inequality both within and between 
nations [4].
The world oil shock in 1973 
contributed both to “stagﬂ  ation”—a 
combination of rising unemployment 
with higher prices—and to increased 
economic power for the oil-producing 
countries of the Third World. Indeed, 
the term “Third World” came to 
be considered pejorative and was 
replaced by the “South”. Stagﬂ  ation was 
interpreted as a failure of Keynesian 
policy. The demise of Keynesianism was 
accompanied by a further decline in 
concern for Third World development 
among elite economists and the 
general public.
It is unlikely that the issue of 
global population policy ﬁ  gured into 
the election that put US President 
Ronald Reagan into ofﬁ  ce in 1980. 
Nevertheless, Reagan’s policies were to 
cement a new orthodoxy about global 
overpopulation and development 
strategies. Unlike his republican 
predecessor, Richard Nixon, 
Reagan considered concerns about 
global population size to be “vastly 
exaggerated” [5]. In the same year, the 
US surprised the family planning world 
by abdicating its previous leadership 
in the effort to promote global 
family planning, at the International 
Conference on Population, held in 
Mexico City in 1984. The US took 
this position against the strenuous 
opposition of the Population 
Association of America, which 
represented many US demographers 
[5].
As foreign aid budgets fell, the 
“Health for All” targets began to slip 
from reach. Instead, international 
agencies promoted structural 
adjustment programs, health charges 
for patients (“user fees”), and the 
“trickle down” effect as the best 
ways to promote development. It is 
plausible that a fraction of the public 
who remained concerned about 
Third World development thought 
that these new economic policies 
deserved a chance. Less charitably, the 
new economic policies also appeared 
to allow people already ﬁ  nancially 
comfortable to abdicate concern for 
Third World development because 
the new orthodoxy asserted that 
market deregulation, rather than aid, 
was the royal road to development. 
The increased domestic inequality of 
recent decades in developed countries 
[6] probably also contributed to a 
reduction in concern for the Third 
World, as working people have had to 
struggle harder to keep their position 
in their own society.
It is now clear that market 
deregulation and generally high birth 
rates have proven disastrous in many 
Third World countries. “Health for 
All”, if recalled at all, is now seen as 
absurdly optimistic. The failure of 
development is most obvious in many 
sub-Saharan countries, where life 
expectancy has fallen substantially. But 
life expectancy has also fallen in Haiti, 
Russia, North Korea, and a handful of 
other nations [7]. The causes for this 
decline in life expectancy are multiple 
and complex. Causes that are usually 
listed include HIV/AIDS (Zimbabwe 
and Haiti) [8,9], ethnic hatred 
(Rwanda) [10], crop failure (North 
Korea) [11], poor governance and 
poverty (several parts of Africa) [12], 
and alcoholism (Russia) [13].
Causal theory is complex. Every 
cause has a cause, and, increasingly, 
causes are being considered as a 
part of causal chains, causal webs, 
and causal snowballs. Some theorists 
distinguish between identiﬁ  able 
“proximal” causes and deeper, 
underlying, or “distal”, causes [14]. Yet, 
among the multitude of causes that 
can be identiﬁ  ed for declines in either 
total population or life expectancy, 
overpopulation is hardly considered, 
except by dissident public health 
workers such as Maurice King [15]. 
Demography, the discipline that would 
appear to be the most likely holder of 
the Malthusian baton, is now almost 
entirely silent about overpopulation 
in developing countries [16]. Instead, 
most mainstream demographers 
appear to consider population ageing 
and European underpopulation as the 
most important demographic issues 
for this century. On the other hand, 
the role of the rapid demographic 
transition in China (from large to 
small families, with an average of two 
or fewer children) is rarely credited 
as central to the Chinese economic 
miracle.
Human Carrying Capacity
Human carrying capacity is the 
maximum population that can be 
supported at a given living standard 
by the interaction of any given human-
ecological system. This apparently simple 
concept has many nuances and is rarely 
used by population scientists. However, 
in rejecting this term, purists risk making 
a terrible conceptual ﬂ  aw, that of 
thinking that environmental and human 
resources are largely irrelevant to human 
population size.
It is irrefutable that human ingenuity 
and cooperation can increase human 
carrying capacity [24]. But even so, 
human welfare will continue to depend 
on the external world, including for 
resources such as food and water. 
Humans are neither computer ciphers 
nor caged mice. That is to say, while a 
given area might tolerate a theoretically 
higher density of human population than 
it does, the reality of human evolution 
in distinct groups, separated by culture, 
religion, and language, means that this 
theoretical maximum will rarely be 
attained. A degree of underused carrying 
capacity can be viewed as a desirable 
buffer around disparate groups, vital for 
reducing tension and preventing conﬂ  ict. 
Even culturally homogenous groups 
can outgrow their carrying capacity, 
as in the case of the Great Hunger in 
Ireland in the 1840s, when the population 
crashed because of famine, disease, and 
emigration. Indeed, Malthusian theory 
was used, in part, to justify the scanty 
aid provided to the Irish from Britain, a 
country that did not identify closely with 
the Irish.
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Overpopulation: A Cause of Crises 
in Africa?
Often, the carrying capacity of one 
region at one point in time is boosted 
by the appropriation of the carrying 
capacity from other people and even 
other generations. Such resources 
include oil, deep sea ﬁ  sh, and the 
stability of the global climate and 
ecological systems. But in Rwanda, 
the most densely populated country 
in Africa, the importation of such 
resources has long been limited. Unlike 
other densely populated countries such 
as Hong Kong and Holland, Rwanda’s 
economy at the time of its most 
infamous genocide, in 1994, depended 
almost exclusively on its primary 
production [17]. The country had little 
industry, few exports, and little tourism. 
The price of its most important export, 
coffee, had declined steeply just before 
the genocide [18]. Unlike many Asian 
countries, Rwanda also received few 
remittances from Rwandans working as 
guest workers abroad [17].
Among the many different 
explanations for the horriﬁ  c 1994 
Rwandan genocide, the possibility 
of a Malthusian check (also called 
“demographic entrapment”) is scarcely 
mentioned [17,19]. A Malthusian 
check in Rwanda was plausible not only 
because the total population was too 
large, but perhaps more importantly 
because the rate of population growth 
in Rwanda was faster than the capacity 
of Rwandan society to process the 
additional people. As a result, many 
indicators of development went 
backwards. The limited agricultural 
capacity forced many young men 
into Kigali, causing a concentration 
of young men with few prospects 
other than what they might gain from 
violence. 
There is even less scientiﬁ  c 
discussion that entertains the possibility 
that the sub-Saharan epidemic of HIV/
AIDS may also be a Malthusian check 
[19]. This is plausible if one applies a 
conceptual framework that combines 
the erosion of human carrying 
capacity through the same rapid 
population growth seen in Rwanda, 
with a consequent decline in per capita 
income and food supply. Furthermore, 
slowly operating feedbacks occurring 
as a result of the epidemic further 
undermined development, including 
the loss of human capital as teachers 
died [20], the loss of agricultural 
expertise as farmers died [21], and a 
deepening debt and loss of productivity 
from the countless funerals. And 
leaders in the developed world and 
many within Africa itself failed to 
devote the resources and provide 
the leadership required to quell the 
epidemic.
Conclusion
Maurice King refers to the silence 
on overpopulation as the “Hardinian 
Taboo”, named after the American 
ecologist Garett Hardin, who described 
the taboos that humans use to avoid 
confronting the need for population 
control [22]. Daniel Orenstein, at the 
Center for Environmental Studies at 
Brown University, has argued that 
powerful social norms inhibit debate 
about overpopulation in one of the 
world’s most intractable trouble spots,  
Israel and Palestine [23].
Whatever the cause of the scarcity 
of modern academic analysis, the 
related issues of human carrying 
capacity and overpopulation deserve 
fresh consideration. The entrapment 
model has an explanatory power that 
is lacking in more superﬁ  cial causal 
explanations. Of course, solving 
entrapment is very difﬁ  cult, but as 
with most medical problems, a proper 
diagnosis will help identify the proper 
treatment.  
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